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For the last decade we have been using double-blind survey techniques and randomized sampling
to construct management data on over 10,000 organizations across twenty countries. On average, we
find that in manufacturing American, Japanese, and German firms are the best managed. Firms in
developing countries, such as Brazil, China and India tend to be poorly managed. American retail
firms and hospitals are also well managed by international standards, although American schools are
worse managed than those in several other developed countries. We also find substantial variation
in management practices across organizations in every country and every sector, mirroring the heterogeneity
in the spread of performance in these sectors. One factor linked to this variation is ownership. Government,
family, and founder owned firms are usually poorly managed, while multinational, dispersed shareholder
and private-equity owned firms are typically well managed. Stronger product market competition and
higher worker skills are associated with better management practices. Less regulated labor markets
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As four Europeans, we are used to hearing that American firms are the world’s best 
managed. American companies such as GE, Apple, IBM, McDonald’s, and Walmart are 
icons of business. And U.S. business schools, which train the top-level managers of these 
firms, dominate global rankings. This was not always the case, however. In the 1980s, for 
example, Japanese firms were regarded by many as the best managed in the world, 
powered by Toyota-inspired lean manufacturing principles.
1 
 
The chief purpose of our ongoing research program is to understand how and why 
management practices vary not only across countries as well as across firms and 
industries. To address this we must first tackle a serious challenge: how to measure and 
define management practices? We believe that management practices can be 
systematically measured, which then allows us to investigate their role in explaining the 
astounding differences in performance across firms and countries.  
 
To measure management practices, we use a new double-blind survey tool. This survey is 
run on randomly drawn samples of organizations across a range of different industries 
and countries and uses open questions to obtain accurate responses regarding the quality 
of managerial practices inside each firm. By systematically executing this approach on 
around 10,000 organizations over the past decade, we have assembled one of the first 
large internationally comparable management datasets.
2 In this paper we will both 
describe this dataset and present some preliminary results.
3 
 
We begin by describing this new survey approach, which focuses on measuring 
management practices along three operations-focused dimensions: (1) performance 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Appelbaum and Batt (1994) for a historical review on the cross-country evolution of 
some of the managerial concepts that are included in our survey. And note that while U.S. manufacturing 
firms are struggling domestically due to high employment costs, U.S. multinationals have been very 
successful abroad over the past couple of decades (see Bloom, Sadun, and Van Reenen, 2012). 
2 Other international management datasets include the Global Manufacturing Research Group (GLOBE) 
survey (House et al., 2004; Javidan et al., 2006) and the World Bank/EBRD establishment surveys. 
3 An anonymized version of the full data is available online at www.worldmanagementsurvey.org. We can 
provide only anonymized data because we committed to confidentiality during the interviews. Anyone with 
access to a U.S. Census Research Data Center can apply to us to gain access to the full dataset, since data 
within the RDCs is protected by U.S. federal law.   3
monitoring, (2) target setting, and (3) incentives/people management. Within these three 
areas of management we define “best” management practices as those that continuously 
collect and analyze performance information, that set challenging and interlinked short- 
and long-run targets, and that reward high performers and retrain/ fire low performers. 
 
There is a vast literature on the theory and measurement of management practices
4 that 
offers a wide spread of opinions on the definition, scope, and impact of different 
practices, and even a debate whether “best practices” exist or whether every management 
practice is contingent. Our management scoring grid has a very practical origin: It was 
developed by McKinsey as a first-contact guide to firms’ management quality. As such it 
targets a set of core operational management practices that have a direct impact on firm 
performance based on the consultants’ experience, and that can be easily measured in an 
initial appraisal. As we discuss below, we also test (and confirm) that these practices are 
indeed strongly linked to higher productivity, profitability, and growth. 
 
Our main findings on management practices can be summarized in ten points (with the 
corresponding figures in the main text referenced): 
 
1.  U.S. manufacturing firms score higher than any other country. Companies based in 
Canada, Germany, Japan, and Sweden are also well managed. Firms in developing 
countries, such as Brazil, China, and India, are typically less well managed (Figure 1). 
 
                                                 
4 Details of the survey can be found in Table 1 and online at www.worldmanagementsurvey.com. This 
survey was originally developed by McKinsey, but most of the concepts in the questionnaire overlap with 
the existing management literature. For example, the emphasis on repeated and persistent organizational 
processes is similar to the literature on static and dynamic routines (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Nelson & 
Winter, 1982; Winter, 2003; see Becker, 2004, for a review). Conceptually, the survey is also related to the 
idea that intangible firm-specific assets and organizational processes are crucial in determining firm 
performance, a key element of the resource-based view of the firm (Barney & Arikan, 2001; see Barney & 
Griffin, 1992, for a review). Finally, the section of the survey dedicated to human resources (HR) 
practices—and in particular the attention to the selection, rewards, and training given to employees—is 
consistent with the literature dedicated to high-performance work systems (e.g., Lengnick-Hall, Lengnick-
Hall, Andrade, & Drake, 2009; Lepak, Liao, Chung, & Harden, 2006; Pfeffer, 1999a, 1999b; Pfeffer & 
Veiga, 1999). Bloom and Van Reenen (2010) discussed the links between their work and the more general 
HR management literature. In terms of methodology, our work shares the same emphasis on data and 
econometric identification issues discussed in Becker and Huselid (1998) and Huselid and Becker (1996).   4
2.  In manufacturing, there is a wide spread of management practices within every 
country. This spread is particularly notable in developing countries, such as Brazil 
and India, which have a large tail of very badly managed firms (Figure 2). 
 
3.  Looking at other sectors, U.S. firms in retail and hospitals also appear to be the best 
managed internationally, but U.S. (high) schools score poorly (Figure 3). 
 
4.  There is a wide spread of management practices in non-manufacturing (Figure 4). 
 
5.  Publicly (i.e., government) owned organizations have worse management practices 
across all sectors we studied. They are particularly weak at incentives; promotion is 
more likely to be based on tenure (rather than performance), and persistent low 
performers are much less likely to be retrained or moved (Figures 5 and 6). 
 
6.  Among private-sector firms, those owned and run by the founders or their 
descendants, especially firstborn sons, tend to be badly managed. Firms with 
professional (external, nonfamily) CEOs tend to be well managed (Figure 7). 
 
7.  Multinationals appear able to adopt good management practices in almost every 
country in which they operate (Figure 8). 
 
8.  There is strong evidence that tough product market competition is associated with 
better management practices, within both the private and public sectors (Figure 9). 
 
9.  Light labor market regulation is correlated with the systematic use of monetary and 
nonmonetary incentives (related to hiring, firing, pay, and promotions), but not 
monitoring or target management (Figure 10). 
 
10. The level of education of both managers and nonmanagers is strongly linked to better 
management practices (Figure 11). 
 
As mentioned above, one immediate concern with our work is that measuring 
management is impossible because it is unclear which management practices are “good” 
or “bad.” Maybe all management practices are contingent on the business situation. For   5
example, firms in India may not adopt performance measurement because wages are so 
low that measuring workers’ output is unnecessary. We find that for at least our core set 
of management practices around monitoring, targets, and incentives, there does appear to 
be a concept of “best” practices. Firms adopting these practices are more profitable and 
more productive, grow faster, and survive longer, not just in the Anglo-Saxon nations but 
in every region we looked at. Moreover, in recent experimental studies randomly chosen 
treatment firms that were helped to adopt these practices demonstrated large causal 
improvements in profitability compared to the control firms.
5  
 
There are several caveats to this. First, there are many management practices that are 
contingent on the firms’ business environment and product, such as strategy, finance, 
M&A, and marketing. We deliberately focus on a narrow subset of basic management 
practices for which best practices most likely exist: those practices that seem likely to 
raise the efficiency of firms’ production of goods and services.
6 Second, there are other 
types of management, such as leadership, that are undoubtedly important to business 
success but are much harder to quantify (House et al., 2004, is the most ambitious 
attempt). Finally, even this core set of best practices almost surely changes over time. For 
example, the advent of cheap computers now makes it relatively more attractive to 
undertake continuous performance measurement and related analysis. But before 
addressing our results in depth, we step back and look at our methodology. 
  
How Can Management Practices Be Measured? 
To measure management practices, we developed a new survey methodology described 
in detail in Bloom and Van Reenen (2007). In summary, we use an interview-based 
evaluation tool that defines and scores from 1 (“worst practice”) to 5 (“best practice”) 18 
key management practices. Table 1 lists the management questions for manufacturing, 
and it also gives some sense of how each is mapped onto the scoring grid. We then 
                                                 
5 See, for example, Bloom, Eifert, Mahajan, McKenzie, and Roberts (2011). 
6 In our view it is an open question whether high scores on our management practices grid are beneficial, 
neutral, or detrimental to innovation (the generation of new goods and services). On one hand, our 
management practices may be complements to innovation, as efficiently organizing a research team is 
likely to get more “bang” for every R&D “buck” spent. On the other hand, the kind of careful monitoring 
and managerial oversight we emphasize could potentially frustrate a more freewheeling innovative culture. 
Ultimately, this is an empirical issue.    6
average the individual question scores for each firm into a single indicator that is meant 
to reflect “good management,” as commonly understood. For retail, schools, and 
hospitals we use a very similar methodology.
7 
 
As mentioned, this evaluation tool attempts to measure management practices in three 
key areas. First, monitoring: How well do organizations monitor what goes on inside the 
firm, and use this information for continuous improvement? Second, targets: Do 
organizations set the right targets, track the right outcomes, and take appropriate action if 
the two are inconsistent? Third, incentives: Are organizations promoting and rewarding 




Our methodology defines a badly managed organization as one that fails to track 
performance, has no effective targets, and bases promotions on tenure with no system to 
address persistent employee underperformance. In contrast, a well-managed organization 
is defined as one that continuously monitors and tries to improve its processes, sets 
comprehensive and stretching targets, and promotes high-performing employees and 
fixes (by training or exit) underperforming employees.  
 
To collect the data, we hired teams of MBA-type students to conduct the telephone 
interviews, as they had some business experience and training. These students were all 
from the countries we surveyed (and so could interview managers in their native 
languages) but were studying at top U.S. or European universities. The survey was 
completed by plant managers in manufacturing, retail store managers, clinical service 
leads in hospitals, and school principals or headmasters. This level of middle managers 
was purposely selected, as they were senior enough to have an overview of management 
practices but not so senior as to be detached from day-to-day operations.  
                                                 
7 For the full survey grids for each industry see www.worldmanagementsurvey.org. The differences across 
industries primarily reflect different organizational structures—for example, using the words “nurse 
manager” and “unit” in hospitals as compared to “plant manager” and “factory” in manufacturing firms.  
8 These practices are similar to those emphasized in earlier work on management practices, by, for 
example, Osterman (1994), Macduffie (1995), Delery and Doty (1996), and Ichniowski, Shaw, and 
Prennushi (1997).   7
 
We interviewed these managers using a double-blind survey technique. The first part of 
this double-blind technique was that managers were not told they were being scored or 
shown the scoring grid. They were told only that they were being “interviewed about 
management practices.” To do this, we asked “open” questions in the survey. For 
example, on the first monitoring dimension in manufacturing, we started by making the 
open statement “Tell me how you monitor your production process” rather than closed 
questions such as “Do you monitor your production daily [yes/no]?” 
 
We continued with open questions focusing on actual practices and examples until the 
interviewer could make an accurate assessment of the firm’s practices. For example, the 
second question on that performance tracking dimension was “What kinds of measures 
would you use to track performance?” and the third was “If I walked around your factory 
what could I tell about how each person was performing?” The combined response to this 
dimension are scored against a grid that goes from 1, which is defined as “Measures 
tracked do not indicate directly if overall business objectives are being met. Tracking is 
an ad hoc process (certain processes aren’t tracked at all),” to 5, which is defined as 
“Performance is continuously tracked and communicated, both formally and informally, 
to all staff using a range of visual management tools.” 
 
The other side of our double-blind approach was that our interviewers were not told in 
advance anything about the organization’s performance; they were provided only with 
the organization’s name, telephone number, and industry. We randomly sampled 
medium-sized firms (employing between 100 and 5,000 workers) in manufacturing and 
retail, acute care hospitals, and schools that offered general education to 15-year-olds 
(which corresponds to high schools in most of the countries we surveyed). These 
organizations are large enough that the type of systematic management practices chosen 
is likely to matter, but small enough that they are not usually covered in the business 
press. Thus, the interviewers generally had not heard of them before, so they should have 
had no preconceptions.  
   8
We used a variety of procedures to obtain a high success rate and to remove potential 
sources of bias from our estimates. First, we obtained government endorsements for the 
surveys in most countries and industries. Second, we positioned the surveys as “an 
interview on management,” never using the word “survey” or “research,” as telephone 
operators usually block surveys and market research. Third, we never asked interviewees 
for performance or financial data; instead, we obtained such data from independent 
sources such as company accounts or hospital and school league tables. Fourth, the 
interviewers were encouraged to be persistent; they ran about two interviews, lasting 45 
minutes each on average, per day, with the rest of the time spent contacting managers to 
schedule interviews.
9 We also ran interviews in the managers’ native languages to make 
the process as comfortable as possible. These steps helped yield a response rate of about 
50% across industries, which was uncorrelated with the (independently collected) 
performance measures for the firm—thus, we were not disproportionately interviewing 
successful or failing organizations. 
 
We also collected a series of “noise controls” on the interview process itself (such as the 
time of day and the day of the week), characteristics of the interviewee (such as tenure in 
firm), and the identity of the interviewer (so we could include a full set of dummy 
variables for the interviewer to deal with interviewer bias). Including these in our 
regression analysis typically helps to improve the precision of our estimates by stripping 
out some of the measurement error. 
 
Validating the Management Data 
Before showing the management data, it is important to ask whether our survey 
procedure appears to be measuring consistent differences in management across firms. To 
do this we carried out two survey exercises to assess to what extent our management data 
appears internally consistent across questions and interviews.  
 
                                                 
9 As a result, these management surveys were expensive to run. Our interviews cost about $150 each 
(including all overheads) across all the survey waves. To help defray costs we actively collaborated with 
several different research teams and governments, and welcome any interest in future collaboration.   9
First, for almost three quarters of all interviews we had a second person listening in on a 
phone extension as a “silent monitor” to independently score the interview. For these 
double-scored interviews we found the correlation across scores was 0.887, which shows 
that two interviewers typically gave the same score to the same interview.  
 
Second, we also ran repeat interviews on 222 firms from our manufacturing sample, 
using a second MBA student to interview a second plant manager in the same firm. This 
helped to evaluate how consistently we were measuring management practices within 
firms by interviewing one manager. We found that the correlation between our 
independently run first and second interview scores was 0.51. Part of this difference 
across plants within the same firms is likely to be real internal variations in management 
practices; no two plants within the same firm will have identical management practices. 
The rest of this difference across plants within firms reflects measurement error in the 
survey process. Nevertheless, this 0.51 correlation across different plants within the same 
firm, which is highly significant (p-value< 0.001), suggests that while our management 
score is clearly noisy, it picks up significant management differences across firms. 




International Patterns of Management 




Figure 1 presents the average management practice score across countries (details in 
Appendix 1). These firms were randomly sampled from the population of all 
                                                 
10 Further evidence of the consistency of the management scores is in Grous (2011). He conducted 
extensive factory visits of 23 British aerospace firms, administering both the Bloom and Van Reenen 
(2007) telephone survey on the plant manager and face-to-face interviews with up to three other employees 
(the CEO/Managing Director, a manager and a shopfloor worker). The management scores from his site 
visits were highly associated with the scores from the telephone interviews (the correlation coefficient was 
0.89 and was significant at the 1% level). 
11 The anonymized data and Stata files to replicate the results are available at 
www.worldmanagementsurvey.org.   10
manufacturing firms with 100 to 5,000 employees. The median firm is privately owned, 
employs around 350 workers, and operates two production plants. 
 
The United States has the highest management practice scores, on average, followed by 
Germany and Japan. At the bottom of the rankings are countries in Southern Europe 
(Greece and Portugal) and developing countries, such as Brazil, China, and India.  
 
As discussed above, we can separate these overall management scores into three broad 
categories: monitoring, targets, and incentives; the country-level scores are shown in 
Table 2. For ease of comparison, average scores are given in the bottom row of the table. 
U.S. management has by far the largest advantage in incentives (with Canada and 
Germany following) and the second-largest advantage monitoring and target-setting 
(behind Sweden and Japan, respectively). However, these data also describe how 
management styles differ across countries. In the United States, India, and China, 
managerial use of incentives (relative to the average country) is substantially greater than 
use of monitoring and target-setting, while in Japan, Sweden, and Germany, managerial 
use of monitoring and target setting (relative to the average) far exceeds the use of 
incentives (relative to the average). There could be many reasons for this pattern of 
specialization across countries. One factor we examine below is that the lighter labor 
market regulations in the United States make it easier to remove poor performers and to 
reward high performers. 
 
What does the distribution of management practices look like within countries? We can 
plot a firm-level histogram of management practices, as shown in Figure 2. The first 
histogram shows this data for the United States, where the bars show the actual data and 
the dark line is a smoothed (kernel) fit of the data. Other advanced economies in Western 
Europe, such as the United Kingdom, have some resemblance to the U.S. distribution, 
except they have a somewhat thicker left “tail” of badly managed firms. In comparison, 
firms in developing countries such as Brazil and India have a much thicker left tail of 
badly managed firms. These diagrams also show the smoothed value for the U.S. 
economy, so that management in these countries can be readily compared to the United   11
States. Another key finding is that China has a more compressed distribution, which 




This cross-country ranking is perhaps not surprising, since it approximates the cross-
country productivity ranking. Although we cannot offer a rigorous argument here about 
the magnitude of any causal effect, it certainly appears plausible that management 
practices should be viewed as part of the determinants of national productivity. A 
regression of GDP per capita on management practices across 17 countries yields an R-
squared of 0.81. 
 
Hospitals, Schools, and Retail 
In Figure 3, we report management scores for three service sectors: healthcare, where we 
interviewed clinical service leads in cardiology and orthopedics units in acute-care 
hospitals; education, where we interviewed principals in secondary (high) schools; and 
retail where we interviewed store and district managers in firms with 100 to 5,000 
employees.
13 Because of funding constraints this survey data covers fewer countries than 
for manufacturing, although we are continuing to extend these surveys across countries 
and industries. 
 
An analysis of Figure 3 reveals that U.S. hospitals and retailers are again the best 
managed across our international sample. What is potentially more surprising is that U.S. 
schools are notably poorly managed by international standards. U.S. schools tend to be 
particularly poor at incentives management—that is, promoting and rewarding high-
performing teachers, and retraining and/or firing badly performing teachers. This may be 
because the U.S. schooling system is dominated by the public sector with strong union 
representation, unlike the other three sectors we examined. In contrast, U.K. schools are 
the best managed within our sample of countries. One reason appears to be that U.K. 
                                                 
12 Chinese firms are 18 years old on average, compared to the sample average of 43.7 years. India has the 
second-youngest firms at 30.3 years old on average, while Germany has the oldest at 55.2 years. 
13 We thank the Institute for Competitiveness and Prosperity for helping to collect the retail data.   12
schools have undergone a series of reforms in recent years to improve management (for 
example, see McNally, 2010). 
 
As in manufacturing, we also see a wide spread of management practices. For example, 
Figure 4 plots the distributions of management scores for hospitals, schools, and retail 
firms, and again we see wide dispersions in each country studied. These spreads in 
management practices appear to mimic the wide dispersions in performance in these 
sectors as reported in, for example, Skinner and Staiger (2009) for hospitals, Foster, 
Haltiwanger, and Krizan (2006) for retail, and Hoxby (2000) for schools. 
 
Our management scoring method has also been used by other research teams to study 
sectors beyond manufacturing, retail, schools, and hospitals. For example, McConnell et 
al. (2009) looked at 147 substance abuse clinics; Delfgaauw et al. (2011) looked at 
around 200 fostering, adoption, and nursing homes; McKinsey (2009) studied around 100 
tradable service firms in Ireland; Dohrmann and Pinshaw (2009) surveyed around 20 tax 
agencies across OECD countries; and Homkes (2011) studied around 200 global public-
private partnerships. In every case the researchers found extremely wide variations in 
management practices across the organizations studied. 
 
Factors Associated With Differences in Management Practices 
Based on our sample of around 10,000 management interviews, we can identify some 
stylized facts regarding quality of managerial practices.  
 
Public (Government) Ownership 
One factor that seems to be strongly linked to management practices is ownership. Figure 
5 demonstrates that publicly owned organizations have consistently lower management 
scores in each sector, even after controlling for country and size. This gap is 
quantitatively large: The average gap in management scores between public and private 
ownership is 0.14, similar, for example, to the overall management gap between the U.S. 
and Sweden. 
   13
As shown in Figure 6, the overriding reason publicly owned institutions score 
substantially lower is that they have weaker incentive management practices. In 
particular, in many public-sector agencies promotion is based on time served, and 
persistent underperformers are not retrained or moved to different positions. One 
explanation for this is the strength of unions, which place a great emphasis on equity, 
fairness, and political criteria.  
 
 
Family and Founder Ownership and Management 
The privately owned firms in our manufacturing and retail sample can be divided by 
ultimate ownership: including dispersed shareholders, family ownership with an external 
chief executive officer, family ownership with a family chief executive officer, owned by 
the founder or the managers of the firm, and owned by private equity or private 
individuals. Figure 7 plots the average management practices by ownership type, 
including government-owned firms for comparison. Because of wide differences in 
ownership patterns across countries, industries, and firm size, we report the management 
scores after controlling for size, country, and industry dummies.  
 
One interesting group that emerges is family firms, which our research defines as firms 
owned by the descendants of the founder—that is, sons, grandsons, and great-grandsons, 
and more rarely, daughters, granddaughters, etc. Those that are family owned and also 
family managed (“Family, family CEO”) have a large tail of badly managed firms, while 
the family owned but externally managed (“Family, external CEO”) look very similar to 
dispersed shareholders. The reason appears to be that many family firms adopt a rule of 
primogeniture, so that the eldest son becomes the chief executive officer, regardless of 
merit considerations. Many governments around the world also provide tax subsidies for 
family firms. For example, the United Kingdom has many more family-run and -owned 
firms than the United States, which is likely to be related to the estate tax exemption for 
inherited business assets in the United Kingdom.  
   14
Since family firms typically have less debt, product market competition may not be as 
effective in driving them out of business if they are badly managed. Without debt firms 
have to cover operating costs (e.g., salaries and wages) but not capital costs (e.g., the rent 
on property or equipment since these were typically bought outright many years ago). 
Hence, family firms can continue to generate positive cash flow while generating 
economic losses because their family owners are subsidizing them through cheap capital. 
  
Firms with private equity ownership appear well managed, in particular when compared 
to family- and government-owned firms (Bloom, Sadun, & Van Reenen, 2009b). These 
findings are consistent with empirical studies indicating that private equity transactions in 
the United States and the United Kingdom result in a substantial increase in productivity 
(Cumming, Siegel, & Wright, 2007; Harris, Siegel, & Wright, 2005; Lichtenberg & 
Siegel, 1990; Siegel & Simons, 2010). Thus, the pattern in recent years of private equity 
firms purchasing firms in Europe and Asia that were previously under family or 
government management may make some economic sense.  
 
A perhaps surprising result is that “founder-owned, founder-CEO firms”—where the 
current chief executive officer founded the firm—are the worst managed on average. We 
are still trying to understand this phenomenon, but one potential explanation is that the 
entreprenuerial skills required of a start-up (e.g., creativity and risk taking) are not the 
same skills required when a firm grows large enough to enter our sample (at least 100 
employees). A mature firm needs to move beyond informal rules, and these may be 
implemented more effectively by a professional manager (see, for example, Boeker & 
Karichalil, 2002 and Davila, Foster, & Jia, 2010). 
  
Multinational Firms 
Figure 8 plots management scores by country for domestic firms (those with no 
production facilities abroad) and foreign multinationals. Two results stand out. First, 
foreign multinationals are better managed than domestic firms. Second, foreign 
multinationals seem able to partially “transport” their better practices abroad despite 
often-difficult local circumstances. We also found that multinationals transplant other   15
features of their organizational form overseas, such as the average degree of 
decentralization (Bloom, Sadun, & Van Reenen, 2009b). We also distinguished by export 
status, revealing a clear pecking order: Average management scores were lowest for non-
exporters (2.62), next lowest for non-multinational exporters (2.89), and highest for 
multinationals (3.25).  
 
 
Product Market Competition 
In our interviews, we asked the manufacturing and retail managers to identify the number 
of competitors they faced in the marketplace. We found that the average management 
score was significantly higher when firms reported facing more competitors (see Figure 
9). Using other measures of competition for manufacturing firms not reported by 
managers, such as the import penetration rates (measured by imports as a share of 
domestic production) or Lerner indices of competition, yields a similar general result that 
management quality tends to increase with competitive intensity.
14 We also collected 
competition data for hospitals and schools and found a similar correlation; that is, 
organizations reporting that they faced more competitors appear to adopt better 
management practices.  
 
A concern with all of the associations of management with “driving factors” such as 
competition is that the correlation is spurious and not causal. In the case of competition, 
this may cause an underestimate of the positive effect of competition, as a particularly 
well-managed organization would be likely to drive badly managed rivals out of business 
and so reduce the number of rivals, lowering measured competition. 
 
This idea can sometimes be directly tested; for example, Bloom, Propper, Seiler, and Van 
Reenen (2010) did so based on a “natural experiment” involving the closing of hospitals 
in the United Kingdom. Politicians control exit and entry and tend to keep hospitals open 
                                                 
14 We defined the Lerner index as 1 minus the average profits/sales ratio of all other firms in the country 
industry cell over the past five years. High values suggest low long-run profits, suggestive of tough 
competition. When we used this and the import measure data we added country and industry dummies to 
control for factors like country size and different reporting requirements; see Bloom and Van Reenen 
(2007) for details.   16
in politically marginal districts, and this creates some random variation in the number of 
hospitals across different areas. Using this variation we find that the positive causal effect 
of competition on management (and clinical outcomes such as survival rates) is indeed 
stronger than the simple correlation would suggest. 
 
In general, we interpret this finding as showing that more competitive markets are 
associated with better management practices. This result could arise through a variety of 
channels. For example, one route for competition to improve management practices may 
be through selection, with badly run firms, hospitals, or schools exiting more speedily in 
competitive markets. A second route may be through incentives to improve practices, 
which could be sharper when competition “raises the stakes” either because efficiency 
improvements have a larger impact on shifting market share or because managers are 
more fearful of losing their jobs.
15  
  
Labor Market Regulation 
Labor market regulation can constrain the ability of managers to hire, fire, pay, and 
promote employees. Figure 10 plots each country’s average manufacturing management 
scores on incentives management (survey questions 13 to 18 on hiring, firing, pay, and 
promotions) against an employment rigidity index from the World Bank, which focuses 
on the difficulties firms face in hiring workers, firing workers, and changing their hours 
and pay. In tougher labor markets regulation is indeed significantly negatively correlated 
with the management scores on incentives. In contrast, more restrictive labor market 
regulations are not significantly correlated with management practices in other 
dimensions such as monitoring or targets. 
 
Obviously there are a number of other factors that vary across countries, so the pattern 
shown in Figure 10 does not conclusively demonstrate that labor market regulations 
                                                 
15 The competition impact fits well with the evolutionary economics paradigm (Nelson & Winter, 1982). 
When competition is measured by the number of firms, more firms could also improve the ability of 
owners or regulators to implement “yardstick” competition and improve management. Underperformance 
is often easier to spot when organizations have local competitors to be evaluated against. 
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constrain some forms of management practices. It is, however, certainly suggestive of 




As shown in Figure 11, the education of managers and workers is strongly correlated 
with high management scores. Of course, we cannot infer a causal relationship from this 
association. However, it is plausible that managers with a college degree are more likely 
to be aware of the benefits of modern management practices, such as lean manufacturing. 
More surprisingly perhaps, is that worker education level is also positively associated 
with management scores, suggesting that implementing many of these practices may be 
easier when the workforce is more knowledgeable. Many of the best practices in Table 1 
require significant initiative from workers, such as the Japanese-inspired lean 
manufacturing techniques. 
 
Our belief is that more basic business education—for example, around capital budgeting, 
data analysis, and standard human resources practices—could help improve management 
in many countries. This holds particularly true in developing countries, and recent 
fieldwork we have been doing with firms in India has provided supportive evidence on 
this (see below). 
 
 
Non-experimental Evidence on Management Quality and Firm Performance 
While it appeared likely that effective monitoring, targets, and incentives should be 
associated with better performance, we wanted to confirm this empirically in our sample. 
To do this, we first examined the correlation between our measure of management 
practices and organizational performance. For manufacturing and retail firms this 
performance is in terms of productivity, profitability, growth rates, exit rates, and market 
value; for hospitals this is in terms of patient outcomes such as heart attack survival rates; 
and for schools it is in terms of pupil outcomes such as standardized test scores. 
   18
For the manufacturing firms we obtained this data from company accounts, which were 
available for 2,927 of the firms.
16 We had performance data for 251 hospitals in the 
United States and United Kingdom and for 354 schools in the United States, United 
Kingdom, Canada, and Sweden. We found that higher management scores are robustly 
associated with better performance.  
 
Table 3 reports the results of the ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions. Our dependent 
variables are different measures of firm performance, including sales per employee, 
profitability, the growth of sales, and survival. Our key explanatory variable is the 
measure of the company’s management quality. In some of the regressions, we control 
for capital per employee and the share of the workforce with a college degree. We also 
include control variables for country and industry (a full set of dummy variables),
17 firm-
level controls for hours worked and firm age, and a set of “noise controls” that (as 
discussed earlier) include a dummy variable for our interviewers as well as for the job 
tenure of the manager, the day of the week the interview was conducted, the time of day 
the interview was conducted, the length of the interview, and a judgment from the 
interviewer on the reliability of the information collected. 
 
In column 1 of Table 3, the dependent variable is the logarithm of sales per employee, a 
very basic measure of firm labor productivity. Our management score is an average 
across all 18 questions. The coefficient suggests that firms with one point higher average 
management score have about 52 log points (about 69%) higher labor productivity, so a 
one-standard-deviation change in management (of 0.664) is associated with about a 45% 
increase in labor productivity (e.g., a 45% increase in sales, holding employment 
constant). Column 2 controls for a full set of country and three-digit industry dummies to 
                                                 
16 We had sales and employment accounting data for 3,900 firms, but complete data for sales, employment, 
capital, ROCE, and sales growth for 2,927 firms. Our sample contained 90% private firms and 10% 
publicly listed firms. In most countries around the world, both public and private firms publish basic 
accounts. In the United States, Canada, and India, however, private firms do not publish (sufficiently 
detailed) accounts, so while we surveyed these firms no accounting performance data is available for them. 
Hence, these performance regressions exclude privately held firm in the United States, Canada, and India. 
17 We should note that including a full set of dummies for variables such as country and industry is exactly 
the same as removing the country and industry means from all variables (see, for example, Greene, 2002). 
Hence, these results compare the performance of firms to other firms in the same country and industry, with 
additional controls for size, capital intensity, hours, firm age, skill intensity, etc.   19
reflect the huge number of unmeasured differences in institutions, regulations, prices, 
accounting differences, and legal structures. We also include controls for capital per 
employee, the percentage of the workforce with a college degree, and our controls for 
survey “noise” (such as interviewer dummies). These covariates somewhat reduce the 
coefficient on the management variable to around 0.233, primarily because better 
managed firms tend to have more fixed capital and human capital, but the coefficient 
remains strongly significant. 
 
In column 3 we exploit the longitudinal dimension of the data and include a dummy 
variable for every firm (fixed effects), which controls for all those unmeasured features of 
firms that do not change much over time (such as technology and culture). Thus, we are 
comparing firm level changes in productivity with their changes in management 
practices. In this demanding specification the coefficient on management drops to 0.047 
but remains statistically significant.
18 These correlations are not simply driven by the 
Anglo-Saxon countries, as one might suspect if the measures were culturally biased. The 
relationship between productivity and management is strong across all regions in the 
data. The significance is also robust to different ways of combining the 18 management 
practices—for example, using the principal factor of the questions instead of the average 
in column 1 of Table 3 yields a point estimate (standard error) of 0.374 (0.019). 
 
In column 4 of Table 3 we report profitability, as measured by return on capital employed 
(defined as profits over equity plus debt capital) and find that this is about two percentage 
points higher for every one-point increase in the management score. In column 5 we use 
the five-year sales growth rate as the outcome. Here, a unit improvement in the 
management practice score is associated with 6.7% higher annual sales growth.  In 
column 6 we examine exit, defined as bankruptcy or liquidation by the last year of our 
accounts data (typically 2010). We find that a one-point increase in management 
                                                 
18 Note that the drop in the magnitude of the coefficient is due entirely to the introduction of firm-level 
fixed effects. This means the parameters are estimated solely from short-run changes in management 
practices, which are almost certainly measured with more noise than cross-sectional differences. For 
example, if we repeat the specification of column 2 on the subsample of 1,349 firms with multiple 
management observations, the coefficient on the management score is 0.210 (standard error 0.029).   20
practices is associated with a 1.1% reduction in exit, a substantial difference given that 
the average exit rate was 2.4% for this sample. 
 
Another key measure of performance is firm size. Better managed firms should be larger, 
and this is partly because the market will allocate these firms a greater share of sales and 
also because larger firms have the resources and incentives to employ better management 
(e.g., if there are fixed costs of the types of management practices we consider). When 
we plotted average management score against the number of employees in a firm (as a 
measure of firm size) we found that firms with 100 to 200 employees had average 
management scores of about 2.7. The management score then rose steadily with firm size, 
so that firms with 2,000 to 5,000 employees—the largest firms in our sample—had 
average management scores of about 3.2.  
 
The association of management with firm performance is also clear in other sectors 
outside manufacturing. In Bloom, Propper, Seiler, and Van Reenen (2010) we 
interviewed 161 managers and physicians in the orthopedic and cardiology departments 
of 100 U.K. hospitals. We found that management scores were significantly associated 
with better performance as indicated by improved survival rates from emergency heart 
attack admissions and other kinds of general surgery as well as shorter waiting lists. In 
column 7 of Table 3, we show the association between management and 30-day risk-
adjusted mortality rates from patients admitted to the hospital with acute myocardial 
infarction (AMI)
19 across U.K. and U.S. hospitals. The estimates show that a one-point 
increase in management is associated with a decrease of 0.471 points of a standard 
deviation in the risk-adjusted mortality rate. For schools, column 8 reports the association 
between management and measures of pupils’ achievement.
20 A one-point increase in 
management is associated with an increase of 0.196 of a standard deviation in test scores. 
                                                 
19 This is recognized to be a good outcome measure of acute care quality for several reasons. First, patients 
are usually taken to the nearest hospital after an acute heart attack. Second, survival is accurately measured, 
as are risk adjustments. Third, providing care for this illness requires the mobilization of a variety of 
processes and services, so that the AMI survival rate is a good proxy for quality of care (Skinner & Staiger, 
2009). 
20 Due to data availability, the school-level measure of students’ achievement varies across countries (the 
variable is z-scored to take into account these differences). In the U.S. we use the math exam pass rate from 
high school exit exams (HSEEs). In the U.K. we employ the proportion of students achieving five GCSEs   21
 
Management Clusters 
A large recent literature has focused on the potential complementarity between different 
types of management practices. For example, the returns on having strong targets are 
likely to be higher if an organization can also monitor performance. To investigate this 
we run a principal component factor analysis on our 18 management questions. We find 
that the primary factor explains 44% of the variation across firms and loads positively on 
all practices. This presumably reflects that some common factor—such as having a good 
CEO or operating in a competitive product market—improves all types of management 
practices within a firm. The second factor explains only another 7% of the data, but does 
load positively on monitoring and targets and negatively on incentives. This suggests that 
some firms specialize more in the monitoring (often those from Germany, Sweden, and 
Japan) and other firms specialize more in incentives (often those from Anglo-Saxon 
countries). Hence, we find some evidence for a moderate clustering of management 
practices, although most of the variation seems common to all practices within a firm. 
 
Potential Downsides of Management Improvements for Workers and the 
Environment 
Many commentators might agree that the management practices we identify are 
beneficial for productivity but would remain concerned that such practices may have 
serious downsides in other dimensions. In particular, could improving these management 
practices have a negative effect on workers’ life balance and/or degrade the environment?  
 
In the first major survey wave in 2004, we also collected information on aspects of work-
life balance such as child-care facilities, job flexibility, and self-assessed employee 
satisfaction. We found that well-managed firms actually tended to have better facilities 
and policies for workers along these dimensions (Bloom, Kretschmer, & Van Reenen, 
2011).  
                                                                                                                                                 
(level 2) including English and math. In Canada we employ the school-level rating produced by the Fraser 
Institute, which is based on several measures of student achievement, including average province exam 
mark, percentage of exams failed, courses taken per student, diploma completion rate, and delayed 
advancement rate. In Sweden we use the grade point average (GPA) in the 9th grade.   22
 
In terms of environmental impact, we found that energy-efficiency is strongly associated 
with better firm-level management. This is likely to be because good management 
practices (such as lean manufacturing) tend to economize on energy use (Bloom, 
Genakos, Martin, & Sadun, 2010). 
 
Experimental Evidence on Management Quality and Firm Performance 
The results shown in Table 3 reveal only conditional correlations between management 
and performance. Unfortunately, it is very hard to distinguish cause and effect from these 
results alone. For example, it could be that better management practices improve firm 
performance, or maybe when firms are performing well they tend to modernize their 
management practices, or maybe something else (such as hiring educated managers) 
drives both better performance and improved management. This inability to distinguish 
cause from effect in management performance analysis is obviously an issue with our 
survey evidence, but more generally the entire survey and case study literature.
21 Without 
evidence on causality, it is extremely hard to make strong statements about the 
relationship between management practices and firm performance. As a result many 
researchers remain skeptical about the importance of management practices for 
explaining variations in firm performance.
22 
 
One way to investigate the causal impact of various management practices is to run a 
randomized management field experiment. The idea is similar to the way scientists 
evaluate drugs—providing drugs to a randomly selected treatment group and comparing 
their outcome to the excluded control group.  
 
                                                 
21 Case studies, while excellent in terms of proving detailed micro-data, have a second statistical problem 
beyond reverse causality, which is selection bias. Unless case- study participants are randomly selected 
they will not represent the average firm. Since the process of becoming a case subject is often quite 
arduous—involving extensive research engagement and information disclosure—it may tend to attract 
unusual types of firms. For example, Enron was a popular case- study subject in the 1990s. 
22 See, for example, the discussion in Stigler (1976) and Syverson (2011). The argument against the 
importance of management is that profit maximization will lead firms to reduce costs. As a result, any 
residual variations in management practices will reflect firms’ optimal responses to differing market 
conditions. Hence, different management practices are not “good” or “bad,” but the optimal response to 
different market circumstances. This view also underlies the contingency theory of Woodward (1958).   23
One such experiment was recently conducted on 28 large Indian textile factories by a 
Stanford University–World Bank research team. They provided free management 
consulting to a set of randomly selected treatment plants to help them adopt modern 
management practices and compared their performance to another randomly chosen set 
of control plants (see Bloom, Eifert, Mahajan, McKenzie, & Roberts, 2011).
23 The Indian 
experiment revealed that the adoption of these management practices for monitoring, 
targets, and incentives was highly profitable, leading to an average increase in 
productivity of 18%. This took several months to occur as the firms slowly improved 
productivity with the gradual adoption of these new management practices, as shown in 
Figure 12.  
 
Interestingly, the Indian experiment also found that the adoption of these types of modern 
management practices was more likely to occur when production conditions were bad. 
When facing tough times, firms were more likely to try to upgrade their management 
practices; in contrast, when conditions were better, firms were reluctant to change or 
adjust management practices. If this type of reverse causality was common, it would lead 
survey research to underestimate the impact of management on performance. 
 
Hence, this suggests that management practices can dramatically improve firm 
performance, and that the correlation results in the survey literature may understimate 
this magnitude. This highlights the need for more experimental research to identify the 
causal impact of changing management practices on firm performance.  
 
Contingent Management 
Thus far, we have assumed that certain management practices are, on average, 
productivity-enhancing. From this perspective, management resembles a technology, and 
there can be technical progress in management, just as there is for machines. An 
alternative perspective is that all management practices are contingent on the firm’s 
                                                 
23 Although drug trials are double blind (neither the administering doctor nor the patient knows who is 
treatment and who is control), due to logistical constraints this experiment was single blind (only the firms 
were not informed about the existence of different treatment and control groups). Even so, these types of 
randomized experiments are clearly much more reliable at identifying the causal impact of better 
management on firm outcomes than correlations from surveys.    24
environment (e.g., Woodward, 1958): Every organization is optimally adopting its own 
best practices given the circumstance it finds itself in.  
 
There is certainly some element of contingency in management choices in at least three 
respects. First, different countries specialize in different aspects of the managerial 
practices. For example, Japan focuses more on monitoring than incentives/people 
management. There are few possible explanations for this: It may be due to cultural 
differences across countries (possibly because Asian culture is claimed to be more 
“collectivist”) or historical differences (the lack of capital after World War II is argued to 
have forced Japanese firms to develop monitoring-focused lean production techniques). 
Second, many aspects of strategic management—such as pricing or takeover decisions—
will be very contingent on specific circumstances the organization faces, with no typical 
or generally accepted “good” or “bad” practice. This is why our survey looks at only a 
subset of the more process-oriented management practices where it is more likely that 
best practices exist. Third, the management practices we assess have not been equally 
beneficial throughout history. For example, rigorously and systematically using data to 
deal with issues and make decisions is facilitated by the dramatic drop in the real cost of 
information technology. 
 
Even with these elements of contingency readily acknowledged, our work suggests that 
this is not the whole story. As Table 3 shows, better managed organizations within the 
same country and industry are earning more profits, growing faster, reducing patient 
mortality rates, and improving student test scores, among other performance measures. 
This is hard to square with the idea that all the differences in management practices 
reflect optimal responses to different circumstances.  
 
It thus seems much more likely that many aspects of management style are not 
contingent. For example, basing promotion on nepotism or keeping workers at the same 
job without any regard to their performance is unlikely to be productivity-enhancing in 
any economy. Moreover, in every country in our survey, multinationals do bring a   25
stronger management approach, even though the multinationals need to work with most 
of the same constraints that domestic firms face.  
 
Future Research 
Empirical research on the international aspects of management practices is somewhat 
embryonic; there are several fruitful areas for additional research. One such area is the 
use of field experiments. It would be helpful to see more management experiments in 
firms, hospitals, and schools to clearly identify the causal impacts of better management 
practices. Another area is longer run management panel data, which will help to identify 
the dynamics of managerial change and make stronger statements about cause and effect. 
This latter approach is part of our ongoing research, as we have already sampled a set of 
2,094 firms in three time periods (2004, 2006, and 2009) and are hoping to run another 
large survey wave soon to continue to build the panel dimension of the data. This will 
help us match the data more closely to various theories of why we observe such vast 
heterogeneity of management practices.  
 
A third methodological area to explore is whether we can simplify our methods of 
quantifying management into a set of “closed questions” on a paper survey. Working 
with the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development, we piloted this on a sample 
of firms in formerly Communist-countries, finding results on performance, ownership, 
skills and competition consistent with those discussed above (see Bloom, Schweiger, & 
Van Reenen, 2011). We are now working with the U.S. Census Bureau to develop this 
approach further into a large-scale publicly accessible management datasets. A 
management survey on about 48,000 plants was carried out in the spring of 2011 and will 
be accessible to researchers by 2012 via the Census Research Data Centers. We hope this 
will be the first of several survey waves, building large-scale publicly accessible 
management panel datasets. 
 
Fourth, this research has focused mainly on operational practices such as improved 
monitoring, tougher targets, and stronger incentives; a general consensus that these can 
be beneficial for performance seems to be forming. We would like to widen our focus to   26
a broader range of practices—for example, human resource practices over flexi-time, 
flexi-place, and job-sharing. There is very little consensus about the costs and benefits of 
these human resource practices, with firms and researchers taking a wide range of 
positions (e.g., Bloom, Kretschmer, & Van Reenen, 2011), so experimental evidence on 
their impact would be particularly helpful, something we are now working on (see 
Bloom, Liang, Roberts, & Ying, 2012). More generally, we hope our work encourages 
other researchers to rigorously quantify further aspects of management practices.  
 
Finally, we are experimenting with ways to bring our research into the classroom as a 
possible complement to case studies. As a first step in this direction, we have conducted 
in-depth interviews with multiple managerial figures (from CEOs to nurse managers) 
within a small sample of U.S. and European hospitals for which a case study existed. We 
are now using this type of material in specialized MBA and management courses at 
Harvard and Stanford Business Schools and LSE, and we hope to continue to develop the 




Studying the causes and implications of variation in productivity across firms has become 
an important theme in social science. While several fields have been studying 
management for many decades, economists have traditionally ignored management as a 
driving factor explaining differences in productivity. We believe the discipline would 
benefit from more interaction with the management field. We have started to bridge this 
gap by developing a simple methodology to quantify some basic aspects of management 
practices across sectors and countries, and using experiments to identify causal impact.  
 
The patterns we find in our large samples of management data lead us to believe that an 
important explanation for these large differences in productivity among firms and 
countries are variations in management practices. These are hard, but not impossible, to 
measure, and we hope the methodology we have developed will be refined and used by 
other researchers to help draw the international map of management in finer detail in   27
additional countries, industries, and practices. To facilitate this, our methodology and the 
data we collected and used in this paper are also freely available on 
www.worldmanagementsurvey.org.  
 
From a policy perspective, several factors seem important in influencing management 
quality. Product market competition has a critical influence in increasing aggregate 
management quality by thinning the ranks of the badly managed and incentivizing the 
survivors to improve (e.g., Bloom, Draca, & Van Reenen, 2011). Indeed, much of the 
cross-country variation in management appears to be due to the presence or absence of 
this tail of bad performers. One reason for higher average management scores in the 
United States is that better managed firms appear to be rewarded more quickly with 
greater market share and the worse managed forced to rapidly shrink and exit. This 
appears to have led American firms to rapidly copy management best practices from 
around the world, with most large U.S. manufacturing firms now routinely adopting 
Japanese-originated lean manufacturing.  
 
We have also uncovered many other policy-relevant effects. For example, taxes and other 
distortive policies that favor family-run firms appear to hinder better management, while 
general education and multinational presence seem valuable in improving management 
practices.  
 
The patterns described here support many new theories developed to explain productivity 
dispersion but also pose many puzzles. So the empirical and theoretical foundations of 
management economics should continue to be a fertile and exciting area for future 
research.  
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Table 1. Management Practice Dimensions 
 
Categories  Score from 1 to 5 based on: 
1) Introduction of modern 
manufacturing techniques 
What aspects of manufacturing have been formally introduced, including just-in-time delivery from suppliers, automation, 
flexible manpower, support systems, attitudes, and behavior? 
2) Rationale for introduction of modern 
manufacturing techniques 
Were modern manufacturing techniques adopted just because others were using them, or are they linked to meeting business 
objectives like reducing costs and improving quality? 
3) Process problem documentation  Are process improvements made only when problems arise, or are they actively sought out for continuous improvement as part 
of normal business processes? 
4) Performance tracking  Is tracking ad hoc and incomplete, or is performance continually tracked and communicated to all staff? 
5) Performance review  Is performance reviewed infrequently and only on a success/failure scale, or is performance reviewed continually with an 
expectation of continuous improvement?  
6) Performance dialogue  In review/performance conversations, to what extent are the purpose, data, agenda, and follow-up steps (like coaching) clear to 
all parties? 
7) Consequence management  To what extent does failure to achieve agreed objectives carry consequences, which can include retraining or reassignment to 
other jobs? 
8) Target balance  Are the goals exclusively financial, or is there a balance of financial and nonfinancial targets?  
9) Target interconnection  Are goals based on accounting value, or are they based on shareholder value in a way that works through business units and 
ultimately is connected to individual performance expectations? 
10) Target time horizon  Does top management focus mainly on the short term, or does it visualize short-term targets as a “staircase” toward the main 
focus on long-term goals?  
11) Target stretching  Are goals too easy to achieve, especially for some “sacred cow” areas of the firm, or are goals demanding but attainable for all 
parts of the firm?  
12) Performance clarity  Are performance measures ill-defined, poorly understood, and private, or are they well-defined, clearly communicated, and 
made public? 
13) Managing human capital  To what extent are senior managers evaluated and held accountable for attracting, retaining, and developing talent throughout 
the organization? 
14) Rewarding high performance  To what extent are people in the firm rewarded equally irrespective of performance level, or is performance clearly related to 
accountability and rewards? 
15) Removing poor performers  Are poor performers rarely removed, or are they retrained and/or moved into different roles or out of the company as soon as 
the weakness is identified? 
16) Promoting high performers  Are people promoted mainly on the basis of tenure, or does the firm actively identify, develop, and promote its top performers?  
17) Attracting human capital  Do competitors offer stronger reasons for talented people to join their companies, or does a firm provide a wide range of 
reasons to encourage talented people to join?  
18) Retaining human capital  Does the firm do relatively little to retain top talent, or does it do whatever it takes to retain top talent when they look likely to 
leave? 
 
Note: Full set of questions that are asked to score each dimension are included in Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) and also at www.worldmanagementsurvey.com.  32
 












Argentina  2.76 3.08  2.67 2.56  246 
Australia  3.02 3.27  3.02 2.75  392 
Brazil 2.71  3.06  2.69  2.55  568 
Canada  3.17 3.54  3.07 2.94  378 
Chile  2.83 3.14  2.72 2.67  316 
China 2.71  2.90 2.62  2.69 742 
France  3.02 3.41  2.95 2.73  586 
Germany  3.23 3.57  3.21 2.98  639 
Greece  2.73 2.97  2.65 2.58  248 
India  2.67  2.91 2.66  2.63  715 
Italy  3.02 3.25  3.09 2.76  284 
Japan 3.23  3.50  3.34  2.92 176 
Mexico  2.92 3.29  2.89 2.71  188 
New  Zealand  2.93 3.18  2.96 2.63  106 
Poland  2.90 3.12  2.94 2.83  350 
Portugal  2.87 3.27  2.83 2.59  247 
Republic of Ireland  2.89  3.14  2.81  2.79  106 
Sweden 3.20  3.63  3.18 2.83  382 
U.K.  3.02 3.32  2.97 2.85  1214 
U.S.  3.35  3.57 3.25  3.25  1196 
Average  2.99 3.28  2.94 2.82  9079 
 
Note: Manufacturing firm sample. Overall management is the average score across all 18 questions. All questions are scored the same across 
all countries and industries. Monitoring management is the average score across questions 1 to 6 in Table 1. Targets management is the 
average score across questions 8 to 12. Incentives management is the average score across questions 7 and 13 to 18. The lowest and highest 
country-level scores in each column are highlighted in bold.   33
Table 3. Management and Organizational Performance  
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Sector  Manufact. Manufact. Manufact.  Manufact.  Manufact. Manufact. Hospitals  Schools 
































       0.105 
(0.081) 




        
Country controls  No Yes  n/a  Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry controls  No Yes  n/a  Yes Yes Yes  n/a  n/a 
General controls  No Yes  n/a  Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
Firm fixed effects  No No Yes  No  No No No  No 
Organizations  2,927 2,927 1,453  2,927  2,927 2,927 251  354 
Observations  7,094 7,094 5,561  7,094  7,094 2,927 251  354 
Note: All columns estimated by OLS with standard errors are in parentheses under coefficient estimates clustered by organization (firm, school, or hospital). *** denotes 1% significant, ** denotes 5% 
significance, and * denotes 10% significance. Sample for columns 1 to 6 is all firm-years with sales, employment, capital, return on capital employed (ROCE), and 5-year sales growth data, except 
column 3, which also restricts to firms with two or more surveys and drops the noise controls (which have little time series variation), and column 6 which just used the most recent year to evaluate exit. 
Column 7 uses all hospitals for which we had AMI data, while column 8 uses all schools for which we had pupil test scores. Management is the organization-level management score. Profitability is 
ROCE, and 5-Year Sales Growth is the 5-year growth of sales. Exit means the firm was liquidated or went bankrupt. AMI Mortality Rate is the risk-adjusted mortality rate from acute myocardial 
infarction (z-scored to take into account differences in the way the index is expressed in the U.S. and the U.K.). The school-level measure Test Scores varies across countries (the variable is z-scored to 
take into account these differences). In the U.S. we use the math exam pass rate from high school exit exams (HSEEs). In the U.K. we employ the proportion of students achieving five GCSEs (level 2), 
including English and Math. In Canada we employ the school-level rating produced by the Fraser Institute, which is based on several measures of student achievement, including average province exam 
mark, percentage of exams failed, courses taken per student, diploma completion rate, and delayed advancement rate. In Sweden we use the 9th-grade GPA. Country controls are a full set of country 
dummies (17 for columns 1 to 5, 2 for column 6, and 4 for column 7). Industry controls are 162 SIC three-digit dummies. Columns 1 to 6: General controls comprise firm-level controls for average 
hours worked and the proportion of employees with college degrees (from the survey), plus a set of survey noise controls that are interviewer dummies, the seniority and tenure of the manager who 
responded, the day of the week the interview was conducted, the time of day the interview was conducted, the duration of the interview, and an indicator of the reliability of the information as coded by 
the interviewer. Column 7: General controls comprise hospital-level controls for ln(average hours worked) and ln(hospital age), a dummy if interviewee is a nurse, the number of sites in the hospital 
network, and percentage of managers with a clinical degree, plus a set of survey noise controls that are 10 interviewer dummies, the seniority and tenure of the manager who responded, the day of the 
week the interview was conducted, the time of day the interview was conducted, the duration of the interview, and an indicator of the reliability of the information as coded by the interviewer. Column 
8: General controls comprise regional dummies and school-level controls for the pupil/teacher ratio and the different types of schools included in the sample (public, magnet, and charter in the U.S.; 
public, voluntary aided, foundations, and independent in the U.K.; public, separate, and independent in Canada), plus a set of survey noise controls that are 19 interviewer dummies, the tenure of the 
manager who responded, the day of the week the interview was conducted, the time of day the interview was conducted, the duration of the interview, and an indicator of the reliability of the 
information as coded by the interviewer. 
Source: Bloom, Sadun and Van Reenen (2012)  
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Appendix A 
 
Extensive details of the survey procedure are contained in Bloom and Van Reenen 
(2007), which we summarize and update below. 
 
Sample population 
The manufacturing management survey was targeted at the population of firms with 100 
to 5,000 employees across 20 countries. These firms were drawn from national firm 
databases and company registries—for example, Companies House in the United 
Kingdom, Dunn and Bradstreet in the United States, and the Registrar of Companies in 
India. From comparisons with national census databases these firm populations appear to 
provide good coverage (50% or more) in every country we analyze. 
 
Survey organization 
We ran management surveys primarily from the London School of Economics during the 
summer, because we could obtain space for the survey team (classrooms are empty in the 
summer) and hire high-quality survey team members (MBA and Ph.D. students during 
their summer break). London is an excellent survey location because it lies midway 
between the United States and Asian time zones and is in the European time zone, and it 
is easy to hire interviewers with a range of language skills.  
 
We organized the survey team into groups, with four interviewers in each group overseen 
by a group manager. The interviewers were paid by interview completed; the group 
manager silently listened in to each interview to ensure interview quality. The group 
managers were people we could trust, such ourselves or Ph.D. students. After some initial 
experimentation we found this combination of piece-rate pay for the interviewers with 
extensive monitoring to be particularly effective in both generating a large number of 
interviews and ensuring high interview quality (since the group managers would provide 
feedback after each interview).  
 
Cross-country management calibration 
We operated the survey team from one location to harmonize cross-country data 
comparison. In particular, all team members had the same initial training, they all sat in 
one large survey room, and they all attended weekly survey calibration meetings at which 
we would collectively discuss one interview and compare scores. 
 
Interviewers were also all required to run 10 interviews each in at least two different 
countries. This typically involved running 10 or more interviews in each of the United 
Kingdom and United States (since all interviewers spoke English) plus at least one other 
country (for example, France for the French-speaking interviewers). As a result, our 
median interviewer ran interviews on managers in three different countries. Hence, when 
we report low management scores in Indian firms this is based on the survey evidence 
from interviewers who were regularly using the same grid to interview managers in India, 
the United Kingdom, and the United States, so are well positioned to make an accurate 
international assessment. 
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Finally, 25.4% of our sample are affiliates of foreign multinationals—for example, a 
Japanese-owned firm operating in France. These firms were always interviewed in the 
native language (French in this example), but we can also compare their management 
practices to those of their parent country (Japan in this example). Interestingly, we found 
that multinational subsidiaries tend to adopt about 50% of their practices from their 
country of location and about 50% from their country of origin. This suggests that our 
methodology is able to pick up cross-country differences in management practices 
despite the language of the interview, the location of the firm, and the nationality of our 
interviewer. In our example, despite having a French MBA student interviewing a French 
manager (in French) at a firm located in France, we would still find on average a 
significant number of Japanese management practices being adopted in this firm when it 
is owned by a Japanese parent company. 
 
Variation of management practices by country, industry, and firm 
Overall we find that in our manufacturing sample around 11.1% of our management 
practices can be explained by country of location and about 11.9% by industry of 
operation (using 254 SIC 1987 three-digit industry codes). Hence, the majority of the 
variation in management practices cannot be explained by either country or industry. In 
part this presumably reflects the presence of substantial measurement error in our 
management scores. But in part it probably reflects the large variation in management 
practices in firms operating in the same country and industry, consistent with the 
incredibly wide dispersion of productivity of firms in these country-industry cells, 
reported by Foster, Haltiwanger, and Syverson (2008) and others. 
 
 
 Figure 1. Management Practice Scores in Manufacturing Vary by 
Countries, and are Strongly Linked to the Level of Development
Note: Averages taken across all firms within each country. 9,079 observations in total. 
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Figure 3. Hospital, School, and Retail Management Practices Also 
Vary Across Countries, With the U.S. Top Except in Schools
Note: Averages taken across all organizations within each country: 1,183 hospitals, 780 schools, and 661 retail sites.




























Firm management scores, from 1 (worst practice) to 5 (best practice)





























































Figure 4. Hospitals, Schools, and Retail Management Practices Also 
Show Large Spreads Across Organizations Within Each CountryManagement scores after controlling for size (number of employees, beds, or students) and country. Data from 9,079 manufacturing
firms, 1,183 hospitals, and 779 schools. There were no publicly owned retail firms, so the comparison is not possible within retail.
Average management scores
Figure 5. Public (Government) Ownership Is Associated With Worse 
Management Practices Across Every Industry We Studied
Hospitals
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2.8 2.9 3Figure 6. Public ownership Is Associated With Particularly Poor 
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Hospitals Schools Manufacturing
Gap between public and private ownership by subcomponents of management
Management scores after controlling for size (number of employees, beds, or students) and country. Monitoring is collecting and 
using data, targets are the setting and effectiveness of targets, and incentives are performance-related hiring, promotions, bonus, and 
exit. Data from 9,079 manufacturers, 1,183 hospitals, and 779 schools.
Difference in management score between public and private firmsFigure 7. Family- and Founder-Owned and -Managed Firms (in 
Manufacturing and Retail) Typically Have the Worst Management
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Dispersed shareholders
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Family owned, family CEO
Founder owned, founder CEO
Management scores after controlling for country, industry, and number of employees. Data from 9,085 manufacturers and 658 retailers. “Founder 
owned , founder CEO” firms are those still owned and managed by their founders. “Family firms” are those owned by descendents of the founder. 
“Dispersed shareholder” firms are those with no shareholder with more than 25% of equity, such as widely held public firms.
























Figure 8. Multinationals (in Manufacturing and Retail) Appear to 
Achieve Good Management Practices Wherever They Locate
Sample of 7,262 manufacturing and 661 retail firms, of which 5,441 are purely domestic and 2,482 are foreign multinationals. 
Domestic multinationals are excluded—that is, the domestic subsidiaries of multinational firms (like a Toyota subsidiary in Japan).
Management scoreFigure 9: Competition Appears Linked to Better Management
Sample of 9,469 manufacturing and 661 retail firms (private-sector panel) and 1,183 hospitals and 780 schools (public-sector panel). 
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Number of reported competitorsFigure 10. Labor Market Regulation Seems to Inhibit Good 
Management Practices, Particularly Incentives Management
Note: Averaged across all manufacturing firms within each country (9,079 observations). We did not include other sectors as we do 
not have the same international coverage. Incentives management is defined as management practices around hiring, firing, pay, and
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)Figure 11. Education for Non-Managers and Managers Appears 
Linked to Better Management (in Manufacturing and Retail)
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Figure 12. Productivity Improvements in a Randomized Field 
Experiment on the Adoption of Modern Management Practices
Notes: Weekly average total factor productivity for the 14 treatment plants that adopted modern management practices for quality,
inventory, and production efficiency and the 6 control plants. All plants make cotton fabric near Mumbai, India, with between 100
and 1,000 employees. Values normalized so both series have an average of 100 prior to the start of the intervention. Confidence




































































Weeks after the start of the management changes